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REMARKS TO THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES
OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES
DEFENSE COUNCIL*
David Schoenbrod**
I look back with fondness on my years at the Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") and have looked forward to
meeting with old friends today. I am going to review the triumphs
and failures of pollution control, using the Clean Air Act' as an
example, draw some lessons, and propose a basic reform.
I.

TRIUMPHS AND FAILURES

When increasing air pollution created public concern in the
1960s, many states and cities enacted meaningful laws. To stave
off control, auto manufacturers and electric utilities asked Congress to interpose an ineffectual federal bureaucracy. The result
was the 19652 and 19673 Clean Air Acts. In 1970, when the state
and local laws were only beginning to take effect, severe smog
struck the East Coast and California. Ralph Nader blamed Congress. Legislators responded by enacting the 1970 Clean Air Act,4
claiming that this time they made the hard choices.
The 1970 Clean Air Act did make a hard choice about new
cars. They would have to be ninety percent cleaner starting with
the 1975 model year. This rule was a stab in the dark, but Congress adjusted and tightened it in following years. Today new cars
are amazingly clean.
As to all the other pollution sources-from giant industrial
plants to corner dry cleaners-the 1970 Clean Air Act made no
* © 1997 by David Schoenbrod. The author delivered these remarks to the board and
senior staff of the National Resources Defense Council on March 12, 1997, in Washington,
D.C. He was an attorney with NRDC from 1972 to 1979.
** Professor, New York Law School. I am deeply indebted to Ross Sandler, former
colleague at NRDC and present colleague at New York Law School, for his extremely
helpful suggestions. I also thank Sena Kim-Reuter, New York Law School Class of 2000,
for her research assistance.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671g (1994).
2 Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992.
3 Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485.
4 Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401).
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rule of conduct, no law. Rather, it delegated the job of making the
laws to the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the
states, telling them to reduce all pollutants to safe levels by 1977,
regardless of cost.
This scheme largely failed. The pollutant most on the public
mind in 1970 was lead in gasoline-as the bumper stickers read,
"GET THE LEAD OUT." The ninety percent law for new cars
forced them to use unleaded gas, but 100 million old cars would
still use leaded gas in 1975. EPA quickly set out to use its delegated lawmaking power to reduce the lead in the gas that would be
used by these old cars. But the agency was quietly warned off by
members of Congress who had loudly supported the 1970 Clean
Air Act starting in 1972. I filed lawsuits to force EPA to act and
won. But EPA under Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter kept
coming up with new excuses for delay. Only after most of the 100
million old cars had been junked, making the marketing of leaded
gas unprofitable for large refiners, did EPA ban lead in gas. Our
efforts produced some modest reductions in lead pollution over
several years. But, by comparison, millions of infants would have
been saved from heavy exposure to a mind numbing pollutant if
Congress could not have passed the buck. Congress would have
had to respond in some way to the popular outcry. The likely
compromise would have required refiners to remove much of the
lead in the early 1970s because adding more than a little lead is
only marginally profitable. Instead of taking the heat for doing a
good thing that would have pleased no one entirely, Congress told
EPA to do the perfect thing-protect health without regard to
cost.
The perfect stymied the good repeatedly under the Clean Air
Act. EPA closed its eyes for twenty years to most carcinogenic air
pollutants to avoid the political fallout of having to issue cost
oblivious standards for them. Only in 1990 did Congress break the
logjam by enacting a standard pegged to the emissions of the
cleaner plants in each industry. But, of course, onto this good law
Congress tacked further instructions requiring EPA to achieve future perfection.
The 1970 Clean Air Act purported to deal with interstate
pollution by putting EPA in charge. Because it lacked the political
muscle to take on contending states, EPA has never ruled against
interstate pollution. Finally, in 1990 Congress enacted a rule for
one kind of interstate pollution-power plant pollutants that contribute to acid rain. '
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While Congress promised in 1970 that EPA would make sure
that the states achieve the national health standards by 1977, this
deadline has been receding to a more distant future. Yet, EPA
claims that the Clean Air Act was a great way to make progress
because the states were forced to reduce major stationary source
pollutants. However, the laws that the states imposed in the 1960s,
when they acted of their own accord, reduced these pollutants
three times more than those enacted in the 1970s, when EPA was
in charge.

II.

LESSONS

1. Pollution control works best when the legislature makes the
law. The clear successes have come from legislatures: for example, the clean up of new cars and the legislated standards on toxic
pollutants and acid rain in the 1990 Clean Air Act.' No one thinks
the legislature is perfect. Environmentalists worry that industry's
money counts for too much. Industry worries that voters will not
realize that they too pay for pollution control. In the end, environmentalists have done well when Congress has faced the hard
choices. For example, a Brookings Institution study argues Congress has reduced new car emissions too much.6
2. When Congress delegates, it cheats. It cheated by pretending to decide how much to clean up, but covertly leaving this tough
choice to EPA. For example, the authors of the 1970 Clean Air
Act officially instructed EPA to protect health without regard to
cost but wanted the agency to consider costs without implicating
them.7 EPA has done so under Republicans and Democrats alike.
Now, with the battle raging over revisions of the ozone and particulate standards, EPA is not being entirely forthright in claiming
that it cannot consider cost. The "regulatory reform" bills that
would put environmental protection on a cost-benefit standard
also cheat, because that standard is so malleable.
Congress also cheated by claiming to do the states a favor by
letting them apportion the clean up burden among polluters. This
was no favor. Congress gets to take credit for promising a perfectly clean environment; states get to take the blame for imposing
the costs.
3. When Congress cheats, the people and the environment lose.
5

Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399.

6 ROBERT W. CRANDALL ET AL., REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE (1986).
7 See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY:
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 65-66 (1993).
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By cheating, Congress ducked the issues that it alone has the capacity to resolve, such as interstate pollution and leaded gas. Congress ducks the issue of priorities. It imposes costly environmental
mandates on states and cities, ignoring that priorities must be set
in the real world. Under these mandates, NRDC attorneys, myself
included, filed lawsuits against New York City requiring action on
air pollution, watershed protection, combined sewer outfalls,
sludge disposal, and more. But, to pay for these and the many
other mandates from on high, the city must take money from other
appealing purposes such as education, hospitals, or public safety.
Because each mandate is absolute, massive sums get spent without
anyone deciding that the priorities make sense.
By cheating, Congress also promises that EPA will achieve
more than its resources, time, and political support allow. When
EPA proposes to make a hard choice, industry and environmental
groups get legislators to pressure the agency. Under such political
cross currents, EPA stalls. The rules that do eventually emerge
are politics dressed up as science. Back in the early seventies, we
used to think that EPA was so political because Presidents Nixon
and Ford were in charge. But when President Carter brought our
friends into high office, we learned that the problem is the institution, rather than the people. The political economy of EPA forces
it to strike a balance between the cosmic political forces when its
actions might provoke Congress to reduce its power. But when
the agency would inflict only many small harms on powerful interests or big harms on weaker ones, Congress as a whole is unlikely
to interfere. Individual legislators and White House operatives
still exert pressure. But other forces that act upon the agency are
perennial. Congress has written thousands of pages of detailed instructions into its delegations, taking no heed of the harm they
may do because the blame will fall on the agency. EPA has 18,000
employees, all in search of what they consider meaningful roles.
State bureaucrats, working through their professional associations,
want EPA to wrest regulatory power and money for them from the
state legislatures.
The consequence is a regulatory regime with which the best
intentioned industrial corporations cannot hope to comply. When
they do not, they get hit with fines disproportionate to fault or
harm. Just ask the many NRDC alums who work on environmental compliance for these corporations. Worse off are the
smaller businesses, the governments, the farmers, and the property
owners. They cannot afford to hire NRDC or EPA alums to staff
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a compliance office that will help them avoid the worst pitfalls of
environmental regulation.
Environmental protection has taken a wrong turn against
which the grandfather of modern environmentalism, Aldo Leopold, warned when he wrote of the kind of conservationist more
taken with his own prowess than with nature. Among many others, he included the poets who write bad verse on birchbark and:
the professional, striving through countless conservation organizations to give the nature-seeking public what it wants, or
to make it want what he has to give.
Why, it may be asked, should such a diversity of folk be
bracketed in a single category? Because each, in his own way, is
a hunter. And why does each call himself a conservationist?
Because the wild things he hunts for have eluded his grasp, and
he hopes by some necromancy of laws, appropriations, regional
or other form of mass
plans, reorganizations of departments,
8
wishing to make them stay put.
It is Congress that has turned environmental law into mass
wishing-perfectly healthy air by 1977, zero discharges to the water by 1985, and other absurdities. It has been the only game that
Congress has seen fit to set up in this town. NRDC has played that
game with maximum advantage to the environmental side. Now is
the time to see that it is the wrong game.
The mass wishing has not only failed, but it also endangers the
environment. A public, otherwise sympathetic to environmental
protection, is angry about overly fussy regulation and politicians
who evade personal responsibility. Environmental law suggests
the anger is reasonable. The consequences so far are the Unfunded Mandate Relief Act of 1995, 9 and majorities in support of
term limits and a balanced budget amendment. While these initiatives may fail, the anger and its causes will remain. Congress may
respond in a way that does real harm to the environment, especially if hard times return.
The mass wishing also departs from the roots of environmentalism. Aldo Leopold set out to teach ordinary people about the
environment because he believed that those who do not understand nature will make bad decisions about it. No understanding is
needed for voters to wish or Congress to promise. Rather, the
laws come down from the agency experts on high. Leopold, in
8 ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC: WITH ESSAYS ON CONSERVATION
FROM ROUND RIVER 282 (Ballantine Books 1970) (1949).

9 Pub. L. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
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contrast, wanted to save the environment from the bottom up. His
vision was not unlike that of the Framers of the Constitution,
many of whom were thoughtful naturalists. They sought to root
the laws in popular support by requiring that they be made by
elected legislators. Such laws will reflect human nature and so
therefore will not be perfect. But, the quarter century since Earth
Day has demonstrated a corollary to Leopold's teaching: those
who cannot accept human nature will make bad decisions about
how government should protect nature. I urge the National Resources Defense Council to include democracy among the natural
resources it defends. In other words, it should continue to educate
the public, fight for the necessary laws, and enforce them in court,
but also to insist that the laws be made by legislators, and to the
extent practicable by the legislators closest to the people.
III.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

1. Congress should stop delegating lawmaking power to EPA.
There are many possible means to this end. I will mention two.
This morning, quite by coincidence, Senator Sam Brownback and
Congressman J.D. Hayworth announced the introduction of a bill
barring agency rules from going into effect unless enacted into
law." The bill already has many sponsors. Their bill may seem
heavy handed because the FederalRegister includes many trivial as
well as important rules. But that is just the point. Congress happily requires trivia because the delay, complexity, and confusion
are suffered by agencies, states, cities, and the public, rather than
the legislators themselves. Were Congress to feel the pain that it
imposes, it would see the wisdom of simplifying what it imposes on
others. A second approach would be for Congress to rewrite and
simplify the various regulatory statutes, taking back lawmaking responsibility as it goes.
2. Congress should tackle the issues that it alone can solve.
State regulation and interstate compacts will sometimes fail to control interstate pollution adequately. State regulations will also fail
sometimes to protect adequately national treasures, such as the
great national parks. Some goods, just as cars, may need to be
regulated nationally. Congress has been slow to do its job and still
is not done with it. Yet, it freely tells the states on how to do
theirs.
3. Congress should let states decide how to deal with the local
10 See Congressional Responsibility Act of 1997, S. 433,105th Cong.
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pollution. The states reacted to environmental concerns in the
1960s more quickly than did the national government. Why, then,
are the states-even those that led the way in the 1960s-so often
in EPA's dog house? Congress has made it so. It claims credit but
forces the states to take the blame for allocating the regulatory
costs and paying for the improvements. It lets EPA force state
legislatures to give their power over lawmaking and money to state
bureaucrats. No wonder elected state officials have turned recalcitrant. The national government should stop imposing national
pollution laws on local pollution problems. Instead, EPA should
offer the states and the public information on local pollution levels, reports on their health consequences, and information on how
to control pollution.
This reform would, I recognize, dismantle our whole way of
making environmental law and, as such, raises many issues, which I
would be happy to discuss. As pleased as I am that NRDC has initiated this dialogue today, it should be broadened to include the
wider environmental community. It needs to begin to discuss how
the environment can be protected in ways that are more democratically accountable and more responsive to the varying wishes
of local communities. To launch that discussion, I propose that
NRDC host a debate in its magazine. I volunteer to participate. 1

iI This offer was not accepted.

